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ABSTRACT
e emerging blockchain technology supports decentralized com-
puting paradigm shi and is a rapidly approaching phenomenon.
While blockchain is thought primarily as the basis of Bitcoin, its
application has grown far beyond cryptocurrencies due to the in-
troduction of smart contracts. Smart contracts are self-enforcing
pieces of soware, which reside and run over a hosting blockchain.
Using blockchain-based smart contracts for secure and transparent
management to govern interactions (authentication, connection,
and transaction) in Internet-enabled environments, mostly IoT, is a
niche area of research and practice. However, writing trustworthy
and safe smart contracts can be tremendously challenging because
of the complicated semantics of underlying domain-specic lan-
guages and its testability. ere have been high-prole incidents
that indicate blockchain smart contracts could contain various
code-security vulnerabilities, instigating nancial harms. When
it involves security of smart contracts, developers embracing the
ability to write the contracts should be capable of testing their code,
for diagnosing security vulnerabilities, before deploying them to
the immutable environments on blockchains. However, there are
only a handful of security testing tools for smart contracts. is
implies that the existing research on automatic smart contracts
security testing is not adequate and remains in a very stage of in-
fancy. With a specic goal to more readily realize the application of
blockchain smart contracts in security and privacy, we should rst
understand their vulnerabilities before widespread implementation.
Accordingly, the goal of this paper is to carry out a far-reaching
experimental assessment of current static smart contracts security
testing tools, for the most widely used blockchain, the Ethereum
and its domain-specic programming language, Solidity, to provide
the rst body of knowledge for creating more secure blockchain-
based soware.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Smart Contracts (SC) have grown in popularity in the recent past
years and are believed to be the next generation of automation in
inter-party agreements in the blockchain-based systems. Smart
contracts are self-directing agreements implemented through a
piece of soware whose autonomous execution applies the terms
of the selement and measurements. e main idea behind SC is
to urge obviate traditional trusted third parties (authority, entity
or organization) to be replaced by pieces of code running on a
decentralized and immutable system. is new paradigm of SC
applications opens the door to many opportunities. One of the
promising areas is for the IoT security and forensics which has
drawn a lot of aention from both academia and the enterprise
world [14, 17, 20, 24, 39, 43]. In fact, the implementation and use
of blockchain has far surpassed its original intended purpose as
the backbone to the world’s rst decentralized cryptocurrency.
e value of a trustless, decentralized ledger that carries historic
immutability has been recognized by other industries looking to
apply the core concepts to existing business processes. ese unique
properties of the blockchain make its application an aractive idea
for many areas of business, including IoT. e major issue in IoT
security is to control and know ‘who’ will be connecting to the
network across a large number of things (e.g. sensors and devices)
without breaching data privacy [12]. Decentralized smart contracts
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on blockchains seem to be a vital remedy [44], [11], [2], especially
in dealing with security aws in widely distributed IoT nodes [5].
e blockchain technology [42] is the essential means for delivering
this trust model envisioned by smart contracts, and appears to hold
great promise for future IoT advancement.
Although blockchain technology is perceived as secure by de-
sign, its embedded applications (i.e. SC) in dynamic environments
(such as IoT) may introduce vulnerabilities in real life situations
[30]. Aer all, these smart contract applications controlling nodes
and transactions are snippets of code wrien by fallible human
developers. Besides, because of their special nature, mistakes or
bugs can have a signicant nancial impact, hence security is of
utmost importance.
To date, smart contracts have been aected by unfortunate inci-
dents and aacks (e.g., reentrancy problem in ’splitDAO’ function
caused $40 million loss in June 2016 [3], and $32 million was stolen
by aackers due a bug within the code in November 2017 [13]).
ese high-prole incidents demonstrate developers (even those
with experiences) may put behind security bugs in smart contracts
that could create serious vulnerabilities for aackers’ misuse [31].
is would be further extended in IoT environments because of
their sheer size and velocity [40]. us, writing trustworthy and
safe smart contracts can be extremely dicult due to the compli-
cated semantics of underlying domain-specic languages and its
testability. One eective way to mitigate this issue is, every devel-
oper embracing the ability to write their smart contracts should
be capable of testing their own code, against vulnerabilities, via
automated static code analysis tools [10], [35], and before deploying
them to the immutable environments on blockchains. Being aware
of the security pitfalls involved with writing smart contracts as a
preventive strategy to avoid known mistakes and vulnerabilities
is a smart choice, since the cost of failure on a blockchain that
handles an IoT network can be very high. Currently, the state of
empirical knowledge within the area of smart contracts security is
in embryonic form. us, the aim of this paper is to take this initia-
tive by providing a rst-time empirical evaluation of static smart
contracts security testing tools, for Ethereum as the most widely
used blockchain in the community and its popular domain-specic
programming language, Solidity. As the soware and security en-
gineering research community has long relied on Free and Open
Source Soware (FOSS) tools for security testing, our main em-
phasis would be on open source tools as well. With this empirical
analysis, the objective of the research is to assess the four FOSS tools
(namely Oyente [25], Mythril [29], Securify [22], and SmartCheck
[38]) based on their vulnerability detection eectiveness and the
accuracy. To accomplish the stated objective, we ponder to examine
the accompanying research questions:
• RQ1 - How eective are the automated smart contract
security testing tools, in terms of vulnerability detection
ability? And what is the most eective tool?
• RQ2 - What are the accuracy scores obtained by the auto-
mated testing security tools in detecting true vulnerabili-
ties?
To manage RQ1 and RQ2, we carried out large-scale experiments
among the aforementioned tools. Based on the presented research
questions, the subsequent hypotheses were detailed:
• Null hypothesis (H0Ef f ) = ere is no signicant dier-
ence in vulnerability detection eectiveness between the
four smart contract security testing tools. It can be ex-
pressed as: H0Ef f : µOyente = µMythr il = µSecur if y =
µSmartCheck . Where, µt is the mean detection eective-
ness of testing tool t measured on all the participating
smart contracts (as shown in Eq. (1)).
• Alternative hypothesis (H1Ef f ) = ere is signicant dif-
ference in vulnerability detection eectiveness between
the four automated tools. It can be expressed as: Given
z = {Oyente, Mythril, Securify, SmartCheck}, x and y
as two single-valued variables belonging to z, therefore,
H1Ef f : ∃x |µx > µyϵz−x .
• Null hypothesis (H0Acc ) = ere is no signicant dier-
ence in accuracy scores between the four automated tools.
It can be expressed as: H0Acc : θOyente = θMythr il =
θSecur if y = θSmartCheck . Where, θt is the mean of the
accuracy of testing tool t measured on all the participating
smart contracts (as shown in Eq. (2)).
• Alternative hypothesis (H1Acc ) = ere is signicant dier-
ence in accuracy scores between the four automated tools.
It can be expressed as: Given z = {Oyente, Mythril, Secu-
rify, SmartCheck}, x and y as two single-valued variables
belonging to z, therefore, H1Acc : ∃x |θx > θyϵz−x .
Within our exploration, there is only one independent variable,
i.e. the security testing tool designed for smart contracts. For this
main factor there are four treatments (tools): Oyente, Mythril, Secu-
rify, SmartCheck (See Section 2.1). e vulnerability detection ef-
fectiveness and the accuracy are the dependent variables measured
in this work. We are collecting the following four building-block
metrics to measure the dependent variables:
• True Positive - TPc: tool correctly identies a real vulnera-
bility in contract c.
• False Negative - FNc: tool fails to identify a real vulnera-
bility in contract c.
• True Negative - TNc: tool correctly ignores a false alarm
in contract c.
• False Positive - FPc: tool fails to ignore a false alarm in
contract c.
e vulnerability detection eectiveness of a tool is measured as
following (which is also referred to as Recall [37] or sensitivity):
E f fj = (
n∑
i=1
#TPi
#TPi + #FNi
/n) ∗ 100 (1)
Where n is the number of smart contracts used, and j represents
a given tool (i.e., j = 1, 2, 3, 4). e accuracy score of a tool is
measured as following (which is essentially a Youden Index [41]):
Acc j = (E f fj + ((
n∑
i=1
#TNi
#TNi + #FPi
/n) ∗ 100)) − 1 (2)
e rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
an overview of the current tools and background in smart contracts.
Section 3 gives and describes the experimental setup; Section 4 gives
experimental design and validity. Section 5 analyzes the obtained
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Table 1: Summary of current tools and their characteristics
Tool Level of
rigor
Analysis
basis
Interface
Means
Description
Oyente Heuristic source code
(.sol)
Command
line-based
tool
Oyente [25] is an automated security analysis tool for revealing
security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
Mythril Analytic
and Heuris-
tic
Byte code
and source
code (.sol)
Command
line-based
tool
Mythril [29] is an automated security analysis tool for
Ethereum smart contracts. It uses Concolic analysis, taint
analysis and control ow checking to detect a variety of secu-
rity vulnerabilities. e analysis is based on laser-Ethereum, a
symbolic execution library for EVM bytecode.
Securify Formal Byte code
and source
code (.sol)
UI-based
tool
Securify [22] is an automated formal security analysis tool for
Ethereum smart contracts. It can detect various security issues
such as input validation, reentrancy, and others.
SmartCheck Analytic
and Heuris-
tic
source code
(.sol)
UI-based
tool
SmartCheck [38] is an automated static code analyzer devel-
oped by SmartDec Security Team. It runs analysis in Solidity
source code and automatically checks smart contracts for se-
curity vulnerabilities and bad practices.
data and discusses the results; Section 6 presents the related work
in the literature; and nally, Section 7 reports the conclusions.
2 BACKGROUND
e concept of smart contract was initially perceived at the source
code level, ‘code is law’. e code-based testing not only in blockchain
programming (including smart contracts development) but also in
other computing paradigms is still favored and eective as it deter-
mines a reasonable degree of reliance on the most comprehensive
artifact of development process, and before deploying it to the host-
ing environment [32, 34]. In addition, due to the special nature of
smart contracts on the blockchain, static security analysis prior to
deployment seems to be the perfect t. Inspired by this, the paper
primarily focuses on the automated static smart contracts security
tools (see Section 2.1) in the Ethereum blockchain by focusing its
aention on Solidity (see Section 2.2).
2.1 Automated Smart Contract Security Testing
Tools
ere are a handful of tools for automated smart contract (wrien in
Solidity) security vulnerability testing based on code-level analysis.
We give a synopsis of the four most related FOSS tools that we used
in our experiments, namely Oyente [25], Mythril [29], Securify
[22], and SmartCheck [38]. Table 1 shows the summary of the
selected tools and their main properties. Level of rigor, ranging from
syntactic, heuristic, analytic to fully formal, refers to underlying
security testing technique of the given tool. e Analysis basis
column represents the type of artifact (source code, byte code, or
binary) that a tool uses as its input source.
2.2 Solidity, EVM, and Ethereum Smart
Contracts
Ethereum is a consensus-based framework that utilizes the blockchain
technology to oer a globally open decentralized computing plat-
form, referred to as Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). EVM pro-
grams are implemented in bytecode that operates on a simple stack
machine supporting a handful of instructions. Contracts reside on
the blockchain in an Ethereum-specic binary format (EVM byte-
code). Developers, however, do not usually write low-level EVM
codes for contracts. Instead, they typically use a high-level language
in an exceedingly JavaScript-like syntax called Solidity that com-
piles into bytecode to be uploaded on the blockchain. Ethereum is
gaining a substantial popularity in the blockchain community, since
the major purpose of EVM programs is as smart contracts that man-
age digital assets [8], and for creating decentralized applications
(dApps).
Solidity [16] is a domain and platform-specic language that is
designed for writing smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain.
It has been the most widely used open-source programming lan-
guage in implementing public and private blockchains [36]. e
syntax of Solidity is analogous to ECMAScript (JavaScript), where
the resulting code associated with a smart contract is compiled to
bytecode and then is run on the EVM to execute the functionality
of the contract.
Similar to dierent blockchain platforms (e.g., Bitcoin, Hyper-
ledger Fabric), Ethereum provides a peer-to-peer (P2P) network
for the users. e underlying Ethereum blockchain database is
supported and updated by the participating nodes connected to the
current network. Each node on the network runs the EVM and
executes identical set of directions. e Ethereum platform itself is
featureless or value-agnostic. It is up to organizations and develop-
ers to choose its utilization in view of their business objectives. In
any case, certain application composes assortments benet more
than others from Ethereum’s capabilities. In particular, Ethereum is
ed to applications that automate coordinate association between
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peers or encourage facilitated bunch activity over a network. For
example, applications for planning digital commercial centers, or
the computerization of complex nancial related contracts. With
regards to programming on Ethereum, there are some key focuses
to note from the Ethereum Design Rationale (EDR) document [15].
In the context of Ethereum, a typical smart contract is recognized
by a unique contract address rendered aer a successful production
of a creation transaction. A blockchain state is hence a mapping
from addresses to nodes’ accounts in the network, where each smart
contract account holds an associate quantity of virtual coins (Ether
- the contract balance) by possessing its own non-public state and
storage.
Figure 1 shows an illustrative sample for a user-dened smart
contract, named Puzzle [25]. is contract manages a simple
reward system in which whoever solves a problem (i.e. puzzle)
will get rewards. To make this contract up and running, the EVM
bytecode of the contract is rst sent to miners through a contract-
creation transaction. Once the transaction is admied into a block
(has to pass through mining process) in the hosting blockchain, a
unique address for Puzzle is generated. en each miner instantiates
the contract by executing its constructor (Line 8), and a local storage
is assigned in the blockchain. Finally, the main code implemented
in the anonymous function of Puzzle (Lines 15) is added to the
contract’s storage.
Figure 1: Smart contract example in Solidity
Once the contract is live on the blockchain, it can be used to
deliver its service to users. Whenever a user submits his/her solu-
tion, a contract-invoking transaction gets directed to the associated
address of the contract. is in turn triggers the execution of the
main function dened at Line 15. In this case, all the sender’s in-
formation, the Ether amount, and the input data of the invoking
transaction will be stored in the msg variable. e contract then
processes the receiving data and handles the reward according to
its business logic wrien in the main function. When a correct
solution is received, the contract automatically redeems the reward
to the sender by executing the code at Line 24.
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
e general process of experiments is depicted in Figure 2. e
operation process starts with choosing a security testing tool in a
random manner, i.e. treatment, following by acquiring a chosen
random smart contract from the pool of contracts.
Figure 2: e general experiment execution process
Tools without a Web-based UI were run from their source les on
an online compiler, i.e. Remix1 as Solidity IDE, or solc command-line
Solidity compiler - whichever possible. We followed the instructions
on tools’ respective GitHub pages to congure installation. Prior
to the experiment, we compiled all contracts and made sure they
were all free from compilation errors.
Aer running the tools against each smart contract, we recorded
the security threats they raised, and assessed whether or not they
accurately identied the known vulnerabilities, given the four-
fundamental metrics of classication, TP, FN, TN, FP.
As with any experimental seing, we were required to collate
a set of object programs (in our case ‘vulnerable smart contracts’)
through observation of experiments execution process. One of the
challenges we faced was the diculty of nding representative
contracts to use in our study without geing involved in legal and
privacy issues. Historically, authors or developers have seen the
availability of deliberately vulnerable products (such as vulnerable
Website for Web Apps security testing) as a practical solution to
1hp://remix.ethereum.org/#optimize=false&version=soljson-
v0.4.21+commit.dfe3193c.js.
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pursue their studies without the fear of prosecution. In this spirit
and aer an exhaustive search in the online resources, we found
two suitable publicly-available sources of intentionally vulnerable
contracts: (1) contracts developed by Trail of Bits2 , a dedicated
security team on foundational tools and deep expertise in cryp-
tography and Ethereum security; (2) contracts developed by the
Ethernaut3 wargame, an online smart contract hacking challenge
by Zeppelin. Although one of the participating tool (Mythril) comes
with a collection of test contracts4, we decided not to use those
with a specic end goal to make the evaluation fair-minded and to
give a reasonable equivalent platform for analyzing all the tools.
Aerwards, we selected a suit of ten contracts wrien in Solidity,
as presented in Table 2. ese contracts encompass a wide range of
real-world vulnerabilities (including Integer Overow, Missing Con-
structor, Reentrancy, Unchecked External Call, Unprotected Func-
tion, Wrong Interface, Callstack Depth Aack, Assertion Failure,
Timestamp Dependency, Parity Multisig Bug, Transaction-Ordering
Dependence (TOD, etc.) with many instances for each class of vul-
nerability. In this way, the outcomes started from these contracts
for the proposed experiments will give premise to drawing more
convincing bits of knowledge. We intentionally only chose open
source contracts to ensure that our experiments can be replicated
by public access to the source code.
Table 2: Smart contracts used in the experiment.
Smart contracts # function #LOC Source
Fallback 5 33 Ethernaut
Fallout 5 31 Ethernaut
Token 3 20 Ethernaut
King 2 21 Ethernaut
Re-entrancy 4 25 Ethernaut
RaceCondition 9 50 Trail of Bits
Rubixi 18 155 Trail of Bits
GiBox 7 69 Trail of Bits
KingOfeEtherrone 7 170 Trail of Bits
WalletLibrary 44 463 Trail of Bits
All experiments were conducted on a similar computer (to main-
tain a strategic distance from ecological predisposition) utilizing
solc compiler (v0.4.21) on an Intel Core i7 at 2.9 GHz and 16 Gb
RAM, under Mac OS operating system. All applied statistical tests
were run using IBM SPSS Statistics v.25 to decide the rejection or
acceptance of formulated null hypotheses. To help selecting the
proper statistical tests, we performed normal probability plots on
the experimental data using p-p and q-q plots and residual analysis
to gain insights into the distribution of the data. In view of the
dependent variables and the results of normality plots, we utilized
the ANOVA test which is solid and reliable. In all hypothesis testing,
a 5% signicance level was chosen, henceforth we acknowledge a
5% likelihood of commiing a type-I-error that is rejecting a null
hypothesis when it is sure.
2hps://www.trailoits.com/
3hps://ethernaut.zeppelin.solutions/
4hps://github.com/ConsenSys/mythril/tree/master/solidity examples
4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND VALIDITY
We designed our experiments as a randomized block with no human
subjects included. Each smart contract was utilized specically once
to measure the impact of each treatment (tool). In other words, each
of four security testing tools were randomly applied on the same
ten smart contracts. is design helped to divide the variability
into variability due to tools (i.e. treatments) and variability due to
smart contracts (i.e. blocks). us, the impact of the tools could be
analyzed without meddling from the impact of contracts covering
the result of the investigations. e statistical analysis was based on
the formal model [33] underlying ANOVA for a randomized block
design of yi j = λ + ai + bj + εi j , where yi j is the eectiveness or
the accuracy score for contract i given treatment j, λ is the overall
mean eectiveness or accuracy score (i.e. µt or θt ), ai is the impact
of contract i (i=1,…,10), and bj is the impact of treatment j (j=1,…,4).
e threats to validity of this empirical research are as per the
following. Concerning external validity, we used a subset of well-
known open-source smart contracts from the blockchain commu-
nity in assessing and testing smart contracts. e chosen smart
contracts are generally suitable in terms of size and the number of
functionalities. Without a doubt, they are suciently enormous to
be reasonable and make the experiment practical. Moreover, the
object programs contain diverse types of common vulnerabilities.
As for the security testing tools, the chosen ones are the most com-
monly cited and used tools available in the literature at the time of
this experiment. e threats to conclusion validity are concerned
with the statistical analysis underling the conclusions. We selected
our statistical tests based a thorough pre-analysis of the normality
assessment of experiment’s data (using p-p and q-q plots). As pre-
scribed by plots, ANOVA and LSD (least signicant dierence) tests
were chosen to investigate the null hypotheses (H0Ef f and H0Acc ),
which are solid. All the assumptions required by ANOVA test were
further met. erefore, the error rate would not be evident and the
threat to conclusion validity could be minor.
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
e collected data are analyzed and discussed with respect to each
research question in this section. In addition to descriptive analysis
of data, we further perform hypothesis testing using ANOVA and
LSD statistical tests to report on the signicance of the results.
5.1 Analysis of Eectiveness (RQ1)
e main visualization technique that we used to contrast the per-
formance of tools was the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC5)
analysis. e ROC curve shows how the recall vs. precision re-
lationship changes, and we can learn a lot about a tool accuracy
from this analysis. A ROC curve plots the true positive rate on the
y-axis while the false positive rate is shown on the x-axis. e true
positive rate (TPR) is the recall (sensitivity) and the false positive
rate (FPR) is 1- specicity (i.e. F PcF Pc+T Nc the probability of a false
alarm by a tool on contract c).
Following OWASP benchmark project6, Figure 3 shows the in-
terpretation guide for ROC plots. Each plot shows a point ploed
5hp://www.statisticshowto.com/c-statistic/
6hps://www.owasp.org/index.php/Benchmark
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on the chart which provides a visual indication of how well a tool
did in security vulnerability detection task.
Figure 3: Interpretation guide
As it can be seen from Figure 4, Oyente tool is not a good instru-
ment since it is far from top le zone (ideal tool). is tool shows
two breaking points when it crossed the guessing line and scored
lower than random possibilities. is could be a strong disadvan-
tage of this analyzer. Additionally, as we observed Oyente raised
several outdated vulnerabilities that deal with class-stack depth
as well as various falsely transaction-ordering dependence (TOD)
alarms.
Figure 5 shows the ROC plot for the Securify tool. Securify
showed a steady performance throughout the trials. It had a large
number of false positives, but is still catching more threats that
Oyente was missing.
Figure 6 shows the ROC plot for the Mythril tool. By looking
at the graph, it is obvious that Mythril was able to detect more
vulnerabilities compared to Oyente and Securify tools. It can be
concluded that Mythril has a reasonable sensitivity and can be
considered a trustworthy tool.
As it can be seen from Figure 7, SmartCheck showed a high
degree of sensitivity compared to all other tested tools. Although,
there was a steady ramp in the graph, this could be due to poor
design in some of the contracts’ logics.
Figure 8 contrast the percentages of eectiveness obtained from
the testing tools over the ten smart contracts. e x-axis represents
the ten smart contracts used and the y-axis signies the eective-
ness score for each single tool applied as result of the experiment.
Neither tool catches everything, but it is clear that SmartCheck
achieved much beer score compared to its peers. Overall, the E f f
values of all smart contracts (10 out of 10) for SmartCheck tool have
the highest gures.
Figure 9 illustrates the total mean of the vulnerability detection
eectiveness each tool from all ten smart contracts. e y-axis
Figure 4: ROC plot for Oyente tool
Figure 5: ROC plot for Securify tool
shows the tools and the x-axis shows the percentage of the aver-
age eectiveness. As it can be seen from the gure, SmartCheck
accounted for the highest eectiveness in detection ability while
the rest of tools had much lower statistics in all.
e provided descriptive comparisons (Figure 8 and Figure 9)
intuitively give some insights into the eectiveness of the auto-
mated security testing tools in which not all data are identical
(i.e. µOyente , µSecur if y , µMythr il , µSmartCheck ). While
SmartCheck demonstrated beer results, this could make it con-
ceivable to indicate that a distinction in vulnerability detection
ability was noticed. Yet, it would not be adequate to reach con-
clusions, including rejecting the null hypothesis (H0Ef f ), as it still
requires conducting the statistical tests (given below) to decide the
signicant of the dierences.
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Figure 6: ROC plot for Mythril tool
Figure 7: ROC plot for SmartCheck tool
Hypothesis testing (H0Ef f ): Table 3 shows the results of ANOVA
test on the eectiveness of the tools. Given Table 3 and based on
the decision rule, reject H0 if p-value ¡ α (whereas 0.0003 < 0.05).
erefore, the null hypothesis (H0Ef f ) is rejected and we can ac-
cept the alternative hypothesis, H1Ef f . In light of this analysis,
the conclusion was drawn that there is a statistically signicant
distinction in the vulnerability capability of security testing tools
for smart contracts.
Furthermore, a post-hoc statistical test by means of least signi-
cant dierence (LSD) was performed to help ascertain where the
dierences between tools lie and nd the most eective security
testing tool. Because, the ANOVA tests alone was not able to indi-
cate which specic testing tools were signicantly dierent from
each other.
e results of this particular LSD test are shown in Table 4. For
each pair of the tools the mean dierence between their E f f scores
Figure 8: Comparison of the vulnerability detectability of
tools across all smart contracts
Figure 9: Comparison of the average eectiveness by secu-
rity testing tools
Table 3: Results of ANOVA test on the eectiveness of the
tools
Sum of
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
Between
Groups
1491.176 3 497.059 8.214 0.0003
Within
Groups
1936.413 36 60.513
Total 3427.590 39
(Eq.1), the standard error of the dierence, the signicance level of
the dierence, and a 95% condence interval are shown. Signicant
outcomes are set apart with a mark (*) by SPSS soware. In this case,
SmartCheck tool demonstrated a signicant dierence compared
to all other tools (Sig. < 0.05).
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Table 4: LSD multiple comparisons on the eectiveness of tools
(I) Factor (J) Factor Mean Dierence (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Condence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Oyente
Securify -3.41111 3.66706 0.359 -10.8807 4.0584
Mythril -6.88111 3.66706 0.07 -14.3507 0.5884
SmartCheck -17.19111* 3.66706 0.002 -24.6607 -9.7216
Securify
Oyente 3.41111 3.66706 0.359 -4.0584 10.8807
Mythril -3.47 3.66706 0.351 -10.9396 3.9996
SmartCheck -13.78* 3.66706 0.001 -21.2496 -6.3104
Mythril
Oyente 6.88111 3.66706 0.07 -0.5884 14.3507
Securify 3.47 3.66706 0.351 -3.9996 10.9396
SmartCheck -10.31* 3.66706 0.008 -17.7796 -2.8404
SmartCheck
Oyente 17.19111* 3.66706 0.002 9.7216 24.6607
Securify 13.78* 3.66706 0.001 6.3104 21.2496
Mythril 10.31* 3.66706 0.008 2.8404 17.7796
* e mean dierence is signicant at the 0.05 level.
5.2 Analysis of Accuracy (RQ2)
Only achieving the highest eectiveness rate at any precision would
not be a veritable pointer of best performance when it comes to
real-world applications and tools. In this manner, it would be as
imperative to investigate the accuracy scores obtained by the tools
concerning false alarms to arrive at a more solid assessment. From
a technical perspective, this two-facet evaluation would encourage
fellow researchers and developers to pick the well-ed tool by
observing the trade-o between the eectiveness and the accu-
racy. e experiment results related to this aspect of analysis are
presented in Figure 10 and Figure 11.
Figure 10: Comparison of the accuracy of tools across all
smart contracts
Figure 10 shows the percentages of accuracy scores obtained for
the tools over the ten smart contracts. e x-axis shows the ten
smart contracts and the y-axis signies the percentage of accuracy
for each tool in the experiment. From the gure, Mythril and
SmarkCheck tools almost outperformed all other peer tools in all
ten smart contracts with recording highest accuracy scores.
Figure 11: Comparison of the average accuracy obtained by
security testing tools
Table 5: Results of ANOVA test on the accuracy of the tools
Sum of
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
Between
Groups
2348.290 3 782.763 14.909 0.0002
Within
Groups
1890.046 36 52.501
Total 4238.336 39
On the average basis and interestingly, Mythril tool showed
the highest accuracy score, though it had less eectiveness than
SmartCheck. Overall, it is safe to say that there were dierences
observed in the accuracy of all the testing tools, but descriptive
results could indicate that the Mythril and SmartCheck tools are
more accurate than Oyente and Securify with less false alarms.
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Table 6: LSD multiple comparisons on the accuracy of the tools
(I) Factor (J) Factor Mean Dierence (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Condence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1.00
2.00 -5.01500 3.24041 0.13 -11.5869 1.5569
3.00 -20.12500* 3.24041 0 -26.6969 -13.5531
4.00 -12.90200* 3.24041 0 -19.4739 -6.3301
2.00
1.00 5.01500 3.24041 0.13 -1.5569 11.5869
3.00 -15.11000* 3.24041 0 -21.6819 -8.5381
4.00 -7.88700* 3.24041 0.02 -14.4589 -1.3151
3.00
1.00 20.12500* 3.24041 0 13.5531 26.6969
2.00 15.11000* 3.24041 0 8.5381 21.6819
4.00 7.22300* 3.24041 0.032 0.6511 13.7949
4.00
1.00 12.90200* 3.24041 0 6.3301 19.4739
2.00 7.88700* 3.24041 0.02 1.3151 14.4589
3.00 -7.22300* 3.24041 0.032 -13.7949 -0.6511
* e mean dierence is signicant at the 0.05 level.
e ANOVA and LSD statistical tests performed below show the
signicant of the dierences.
Hypothesis testing (H0Acc ): To factually exhibit the accuracy’s
dierences between the tools under evaluation, the ANOVA was
once again carried out to check the respected hypothesis (H0Acc ).
Likewise with the past ANOVA test on the eectiveness, the con-
dence level of signicance for the hypothesis testing was set to
α = 0.05 as well. Table 5 and Table 6 show the results of ANOVA
statistical test and LSD respectively.
As it can be seen from Table 5, p-value (0.0002) is less than
α = (0.05), thus the results suggest rejecting the null hypothesis
H0Acc in favor of the alternativeH1Acc at the 0.05 signicance level.
Following the recommendation, the choice was made to dismiss
the null hypothesis and as needs be, acknowledge the alternative
hypothesis.
As we were keen to nd out where the contrasts between the
testing tools lie, a LSD test was additionally performed to indicate
the dierences in a pair-wise manner. For each couple of the tools
the mean dierence between their accuracy scores (Eq. (2)), the
standard error of the dierence, the signicance level of the dier-
ence, and a 95% condence level are shown. Notably, Mythril and
SmartCheck tools demonstrated signicant dierences in all pairs
with the remaining tools (Sig. < 0.05).
Finally, it can be concluded that the results of these experiments
seemingly set up a trade-o between the vulnerability capability
detection and the accuracy of smart contract-specic security test-
ing tools in the Ethereum blockchain, likewise with classic trade-o
between eectiveness and eciency reported in the literature in
all realms of testing.
6 RELATEDWORK
e nature of work given in this paper is generally related to secu-
rity testing and vulnerability assessment of smart contracts on the
blockchain. is section presents the related work (including ap-
proaches and tools) and secondary studies (including experiments
and surveys) in this area.
Most recently, Parizi et al. [31], conducted an empirical analysis
of smart contract programming languages based on usability and
security from new developers point of view. ey selected three
programming languages for their experiment, i.e. Solidity, Pact7
(a high-level language for the Kadena8 platform) and Liquidity9
(a high-level language for the Tezos10 platform). e results of
their experiment indicated that new contract developers found
Solidity to be the most ecient language with the highest usability
score and the shortest average implementation times. But, it was
found that 73.33% of implemented Solidity contracts had security
vulnerabilities, while no known security vulnerabilities were found
in contracts implemented with Pact and Liquidity. In conclusion, the
study concluded that although Solidity is the most usable language
to a new developer, it is also the most vulnerable to malicious aacks
as new developers tend to leave behind security vulnerabilities
which can leave the contracts insecure.
Destefanis et al. [13] advocated the need for a discipline of
Blockchain Soware Engineering (BOSE), addressing the security
issues posed by smart contract programming and other applications
running on the Ethereum blockchain. e authors presented a case
study of the Parity11 wallet’s smart contract library, where poor
programming practices led to a situation where an anonymous user
was able to freeze about 500K Ether (150M USD) in November 2017.
e analysis of the case led to the authors concluding that vulnera-
bility of the library was mainly due to a negligent programming
activity rather than a problem in the Solidity language.
Atzei et al. [3] provided a systematic exposition of the security
vulnerabilities of Ethereum and Solidity. e authors presented a
7hp://kadena.io/docs/Kadena-PactWhitepaper.pdf
8hp://kadena.io/
9hps://github.com/OCamlPro/liquidity/blob/master/docs/liquidity.md
10hps://tezos.com/
11hps://www.parity.io/
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taxonomy of causes of vulnerabilities, classifying them on three
levels namely Solidity (Call to the unknown, Gasless send, Excep-
tion disorders, Type casts, Reentrancy, keeping secrets), EVM (Im-
mutable bugs, Ether lost in transfer, Stack size limit) and Blockchain
(Unpredictable state, Generating randomness, Time constraints).
Additionally, the authors accompanied their taxonomy with actual
aacks which exploit detected vulnerabilities except Type casts,
Ether lost in transfer and generating randomness vulnerabilities.
To conclude their survey, the authors recommended the process of
formal verication of smart contracts to ensure that the intended
behavior and the actual behavior of the smart contracts are ex-
actly the same. Moreover, the authors suggested the use of Turing-
incomplete, human-readable languages for formal verication as
the choice of Turing complete languages limits formal verication.
While the above-mentioned works primarily focused on com-
paring and highlighting the possible security vulnerabilities with
Ethereum and Solidity, the works mentioned below focus on min-
imizing and mitigating security vulnerabilities with various ap-
proaches for verication of smart contracts [26] on the Ethereum
blockchain.
Abdellatif and Brousmich [1] proposed a semantics-based formal
method approach for vercation of smart contracts and blockchain
properties. e authors modeled a smart contract’s behavior and in-
teractions with its hosting environment by applying this approach
through an illustrative example. ey simulated these behaviors in
the BIP (Behavior Interaction Priorities) framework [6], equipped
with a series of runtime verication and simulation engines [7]. In
this study, results were analyzed using a SMC (Statistical Model
Checking) [23] tool, which allowed the authors to reveal scenar-
ios where the smart contract behaviors could be compromised by
malicious users.
Bhargavan et al. [8] designed a framework to examine and verify
the runtime safety and the functional correctness of the Ethereum
contracts by translation to F*, a functional programming language
aimed at program verication. e authors proposed two prototype
tools which translate the contracts to F* programs for developing
more secure end-contracts. In a similar work, Grishchenko et al.
[18] presented the rst complete small-step semantics of EVM
bytecode, which they formalized in the F* proof assistant based on
a combination of hyper- and safety properties, obtaining executable
code that they successfully validated against the ocial Ethereum
test suite.
Mavridou and Laszka [27] introduced FSolidM12 , a framework
rooted in rigorous semantics for designing smart contracts as Finite
State Machines (FSM). e authors presented a tool for creating FSM
on a highly usable GUI and for automatically generating Ethereum
smart contracts. e authors [28] provided a demonstration of the
FSolidM tool in a later work.
Kalra et al. [21] proposed a framework ’ZEUS’ to verify the
correctness and validate the fairness of smart contracts. ZEUS
leverages both abstract interpretation and symbolic model check-
ing, along with the power of constrained horn clauses to quickly
verify contracts for safety. e authors built a prototype of ZEUS
for Ethereum and Fabric13 blockchain platforms and evaluated it
12hps://github.com/anmavrid/smart-contracts
13hps://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
with smart contracts. e evaluation found 94.6% of contracts (con-
taining cryptocurrency worth more than USD 0.5 billion) to be
securely vulnerable.
Breindenbach et al. [9] proposed the Hydra Framework, which is
a principled approach for modeling and administering bug bounties
that incentivize bug disclosure. e framework transforms pro-
grams via N-of-N-version programming (NNVP), a variant of clas-
sical N-version programming [4] that runs multiple independent
program instances. e Hydra Framework was applied to sample
smart contracts and it was concluded it could greatly amplify the
power of bounties to incentivize bug disclosure by economically
rational adversaries.
Lastly, Idelberger et al. [19] investigated the possibilities of us-
ing logic-based smart contracts on blockchain systems to boost
their general safety and security. e authors demonstrated that
a logical-based approach could benecially complement its pro-
cedural counterpart with respect to the negotiation, formation,
storage/notarizing, enforcement, monitoring and activities related
to dispute resolution. It was proven that the logic and procedural
approaches are not incompatible, contrarily, they have the poten-
tial to advantageously complement each other for more quality
contracts.
In summary, it can be said that sound empirical studies in the
eld of smart contract security is currently lagging as compared
to primary studies. To the extent of our knowledge, the work
presented in this paper was the rst of its kind that statistically ana-
lyzes and evaluates security analysis tools for smart contracts based
on the eectiveness in vulnerability detection and the accuracy.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a comprehensive empirical evaluation
of open source automatic security analysis tools for the security
vulnerability detection of Ethereum smart contracts wrien in So-
lidity. We tested those tools on ten real-world smart contracts from
both vulnerability eectiveness and accuracy of true detection view-
points. e results of our experiments showed that SmartCheck
tool is statistically more eective than the other automated security
testing tools at 95% signicance level (p < 0.05). Concerning the
accuracy, Mythril was found to be signicantly (p < 0.05) accurate
with issuing the lowest number of false alarms among peer tools.
ese results could imply that SmartCheck could currently be the
most eective static security testing tool for Solidity smart con-
tracts on the Ethereum blockchain but perhaps less accurate than
Mythril.
As a general conclusion, our work indicates that research on
the empirical knowledge evaluation of security testing for smart
contracts is scarce in the literature, especially in relation to IoT, as
perhaps this domain is still in a state of infancy. Hence, our work
contributed towards lling this gap by providing: (1) a ne-grained
methodology to conduct such empirical study for future use by
fellow researchers, (2) comparable experimental results on the state-
of-the-art smart contracts security testing tools, and (3) statistical
tests and constructive insights into the challenges associated with
testing smart contracts. We hope our work motivates researchers
and developers to come up with more new and innovative ideas,
frameworks, and tools that would result in writing safer, secure
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and vulnerability-immune smart contracts in the future. In our
view, IoT combined with smart contracts on blockchains are helpful
in building more trustworthy and secure networks, and it would
appear to hold great promise for future IoT security development.
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